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concurring in the judgment.
In my view, the question regarding modification of the exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 1982,
- - U. S.
(1982), is properly before us and should be
addressed. I continue to believe that the exclusionary rule
is an inappropriate remedy where law enforcement officials
act in the reasonable belief that a search and seizure was consistent with the Fourth Amendment-a position I set forth in
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 537-539 (1976). In this case,
it was fully reasonable for the Bloomingdale, Illinois police to
believe that their search of respondents' house and automobile comported with the Fourth Amendment as the search
was conducted pursuant to a judicially-issued warrant. The
exclusion of probative evidence where the constable has not
blundered not only sets the criminal free but fails to serve
any constitutional interest in securing compliance with the
important requirements of the Fourth Amendment. On this
basis, I concur in the Court's judgment that the decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court must be reversed.
JUSTICE WHITE,

I

The Court declines to address the exclusionary rule question because the Illinois courts were not invited to modify the
rule in the first instance. The Court's refusal to face this important q·uestion cannot be ascribed to jurisdictional limita-

2
•
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tions. I fully ag·ree that the statt1te which gives tls jurisdiction in this cau:se , 1 8 U. S. C. § 1257(3}. i)revents us from
decidi11g federal constitt1tio11al claims raised her e for the first
tim 011 rev·ie'v of state court decisiot1s. Cardina le v. Lo?ti~ ia n a.. 394 U. S. 437, 438-439 (1969).
But it is equally wellestablished that "[11]0 p,u·tictllar form of words or phrases is
esse11tial, btlt 011ly that tl1e claim of invalidity and the ground
therefore be broug·h t to the atte11tion of the state court with

fair precision and in due time." St1·eet v. N ew Yotk, 394 U . S.
576. 584 (1969) (quoting 1Ve~u Yo1·k ex rel. B~ryant v.
zz:~, n ~J n ernzan!. 278 U. S. 63, 67 (1928)). Notwithstanding the

select and controversial instances in which the Court has rev·ersed a state court decision for "plain error," 1 we have consistently dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the federal
claim asserted in this Court was not raised below. But this
obviously is not such a case. As the Court points out, "It is
clear in this case that respondents expressly raised, at every
level of the Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth
Amendment had been violated by the actions of the Illinois
police and that the evidence seized by the officers should be
excluded from their trial." Ante, at 5. Until today, we
have not required more.
We have never suggested that the jurisdictional stipulations of § 1257 require that all arguments on behalf of, let
alone in opposition to, a federal claim be raised and decided
below. 2 See R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court PracSee e. g, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Wood v. Georgia,
450 U. S. 261 (1980); Vachon v. New Hamphsire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974) (per
curia1n). Of course, to the extent these cases were correctly decided,
they indicate a fortiori that the exclusionary rule issue in this case is properly before us.
2
The Court has previously relied on issues and arguments not raised in
the state court below in order to dispose of a federal question that was
properly raised. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 658, the Court held that
unmarried fathers could not be denied a hearing on parental fitness that
was afforded other Illinois parents. Although this issue was not pre1
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tice 230 (1978). Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 (1898)
distinguished the raising of constitutional claims and the
making of arguments in support of or inopposition to those
claims.
"If the question were only an enlargement of the one
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were so
connected with it in substance as to form but another
ground or reason for alleging the invalidity of the personal judgment, we should have no hesitation in holding
the assignment sufficient to permit the question to be
now raised and argued. Parties are not confined here to

the same arguments which were advanced in the courts
below upon a federal question there discussed." 173
U. S. at 197-198 (emphasis added). 3

Under Dewey, which the Court hails as the "fullest treatment
of the subject," ante, at 4, the exclusionary rule issue is but
another argument pertaining to the Fourth Amendment
question squarely presented in the Illinois courts.
The presentation and decision of respondent's Fourth
Amendment claim fully embraces the argument that due to
sented in the Illinois courts, the Court found that it could properly be considered: "we dispose of the case on the constitutional premise raised below,
reaching the result by a method of analysis readily available to the state
court. For the same reason, the strictures of Cardinale ... and Hill,
have been fully observed." 405 U. S., at 658, n. 10. The dissent argued
that the Court was deciding a due process claim instead of an equal protection one, but there was no suggestion that it mattered at all that the Court
had relied on a different type of equal protection argument.
3
As the Court explains, ante, at 4, n. 2, in Dewey, appellant argued only
that the imposition of personal liability against him violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not received
personal notice of the assessment proceedings. In this Court, appellant
sought to raise a takings argument for the first time. The Court declined
to pass on the issue because, although arising from a single factual occurrence the two claims "are not in anywise necessarily connected," 173 U. S.,
at 198.
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the nature of the alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the
seized evidence should not be excluded. Our decisions concerning the scope of the exclusionary rule cannot be divorced
from the Fourth Amendment; they rest on the relationship of
Fourth Amendment interests to the objectives of the criminal
justice system. See, e. g. United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U. S. 268 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). 4
Similarly, the issues surrounding a proposed good faith modification are intricately and inseverably tied to the nature of
the Fourth Amendment violation: the degree of probable
cause, the presence of a warrant, and the clarity of previously announced Fourth Amendment principles all inform the
good faith issue. The Court's own holding that the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
"substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed, ante, at 28, i~~tself but a variation on the good-faith
theme. See Brie\ o~ Petitioner on Reargument.
As a jurisdictiona1 requirement, I have no doubt that the
exclusionary rule question is before us as an indivisible element of the claim that the Constitution requires exclusion of
certain evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As a prudential matter, I am unmoved by the Court's
lengthy discourse as to why it must avoid the question.
First, the Court turns on its head the axiom that " 'due reThe Court relies on these cases for the surprising assertion that the
Fourth Amendment and exclusionary rule questions are "distinct." Past
decisions finding that the remedy of exclusion is not always appropriate
upon the finding of a Fourth Amendment violation acknowledge the close
For example, in United States v. Ceccolini it
relationship of the issues.
was said: "The constitutional question under the Fourth Amendment was
phrased in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), as whether
'the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery
of the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.' " 435 U. S., at 275-276. It is also suprising to learn that the issues
in Stone v. Powell are "distinct" from the Fourth Amendment. I had understood the very essence of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978) to be
that standing to seek exclusion of evidence could not be divorced from substantive Fourth Amendment rights.
4

81-430--CONCUR
ILLINOIS v. GATES

5

gard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state
courts' McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale, 309 U. S. 430,
435-436 (1940), demands that those courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state
officials" ante, at 6. This statement, written to explain why
a state statute should not be struck down on federal grounds
not raised in the state courts, 6 hardly applies when the question is whether a rule of federal law articulated by this Court
should now be narrowed to reduce the scope of federal intrusion into the state's administration of criminal justice. Insofar as modifications of the federal exclusionary rule are concerned, the Illinois courts are bound by this Court's
pronouncements. Cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719
(1975). I see little point in requiring a litigant to request a
state court to overrule or modify one of this Court's precedents. Far from encouraging the stability of our precedents,
the Court's proposed practice could well undercut stare decisis.
Either the presentation of such issues to the lower
courts will be a completely futile gesture or the lower courts
are now invited to depart from this Court's decisions whenever they conclude such a modification is in order. 6
Consider the full context of the statement in McGoldrick:
"In cases coming here from state courts in which a state statute is assailed
as unconstitutional, there are reasons of particular force which should lead
us to refrain from deciding questions not presented or decided in the highest court of the state whose judicial action we are called upon to review.
Apart from the reluctance with which every court should proceed to set
aside legislation as unconstitutional on grounds not properly presented,
due regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts requires us to decline to consider and decide questions affecting the validity
of state statutes not urged or considered there. It is for these reasons
that this Court, where the constitutionality of a statute has been upheld in
the state court, consistently refuses to consider any grounds of attack not
raised or decided in that court."
6
The Court observes that "although the Illinois courts applied the federal exclusionary rule, there was never 'any real contest' upon the point."
Ante, at 7. But the proper forum for a "real contest" on the continued
vitality of the exclusionary rule that has developed from our decisions in
5
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The Court correctly notes that Illinois may choose to pursue a different course with respect to the state exclusionary
rule. If this Court were to formulate a "good faith" exception to the federal exclusionary rule, the Illinois Supreme
Court would be free to consider on remand whether the state
exclusionary rule should be modified accordingly. The possibility that it might have relied upon the state exclusionary
rule had the "good-faith" question been posed does not constitute independent and adequate state grounds. "The possibility that the state court might have reached the same conclusion if it had decided the question purely as a matter of
state law does not create an adequate and independent state
ground that relieves this Court of the necessity of considering the federal question." United Air Lines v. Mahin, 410
U. S. 623, 630-631 (1973); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35,
37, n. 3 (1967); C. Wright, Federal Courts § 107, p. 488 (2d
ed. 1970). Nor does having the state court first decide
whether the federal exclusionary rule should be modifiedand presentation of the federal question does not insure that
the equivalent state law issue will be raised or decided 7avoid the unnecessary decision of a federal question. The
Court still must reach a federal question to decide the instant
case. Thus, in today's opinion, the Court eschews modification of the exclusionary rule in favor of interring the test established by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964) and
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). Nor is the
exclusionary rule question avoided-it is simply deferred
until "another day."
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1961) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S.
643 (1961) is this Court.
7
Nor is there any reason for the Illinois courts to decide that question in
advance of this Court's decision on the federal exclusionary rule. Until
the federal rule is modified, the state law question is entirely academic.
The state courts should not be expected to render such purely advisory
decisions.

---

-~
- ---- ~-

---·

~

.,._......., _ ~----
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It also appears that the Court, in disposing of the case,
does not strictly follow its own prudential advice. The Illinois Supreme Court found not only a violation of the Fourth
Amendment but also of Article I, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution which also provides assurance against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Taking the Court's new prudential
standards on their own terms, the Illinois courts should be
given the opportunity to consider in the first instance
whether a "totality of the circumstances" test should replace
the more precise rules of Aguilar and Spinelli. The Illinois
Supreme Court may decide to retain the established test for
purposes of its state constitution just as easily as it could decide to retain an unmodified exclusionary rule. 8
Finally, the Court correctly notes that a fully-developed
record is helpful if not indispensable for the decision of many
issues. I too resist the decision of a constitutional question
when such guidance is necessary, but the question of whether
the exclusionary rule should be modified is an issue of law
which obviously goes far beyond and depends little on the
subjective good faith of the police officers that searched the
Gates' property. Moreover,' the case comes here with a fully
developed record as to the actions of the Bloomingdale, Illinois police, If further factual development of whether the
officers in this case acted in good faith were important, that
issue could should logically be considered on remand, following this Court's statement of the proper legal standards. 9

-

Respondents urge this precise argument. Brief o~~ Respondent at
24-27; Brief for Respondent on Reargument, at 6. Of cnurse, under traditional principles the possibility that the state court might reach a different
conclusion in interpreting its state constitution does not make it improper
for us to decide the federal issue. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648,
651-653 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S.
562, 568 (1977).
9
It also should be noted that the requirement that the good faith issue
be presented to the Illinois courts has little to do with whether the record
8
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The Court's straining to avoid coming to grips with the exclusionary rule issue today may be hard for the country to understand-particularly given earlier statements by some
members of the Court. 10 The question has been fully briefed
and argued by the parties and amici curiae, including the
United States. 11 The issue is central to the enforcement of
law and the administration of justice throughout the nation.
The Court of Appeals for the second largest federal circuit
has already adopted such an exception, United States v. Williams, 622 U. S. 830 (CA5 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449
U. S. 1127 (1981), and the new Eleventh Circuit is presumably bound by its decision. Several members of this Court
have for some time expressed the need to consider modifying
the exclusionary rule, ante, at 9, and Congress as well has
been active in exploring the question. See The Exclusionary
Rule Bills, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong; 1st and
2d Sess. At least one state has already enacted a good faith
exception. Colo Rev. &at. Tit. 16, Art. 3, § 308. Of course,
if there is a jurisdictional barrier to deciding the issue, none
of these considerations are relevant. But if no such proceis complete. I doubt that the raising of the good faith issue below would
have been accompanied by any different record. And this Court may dismiss a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted when the record makes
decision of a federal question unwise. See, e. g., Minnick v. Calif. Department of Corrections, 452 U. S. 105 (1981).
10
In California v. Minjares, 443 U. S. 916, 928 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J.,
joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting from the denial of stay), the
author of the Court's opinion today urged that the parties be directed to
brief whether the exclusionary rule should be retained. In Minjares, like
this case, respondents had raised a Fourth Amendment claim but petitioners had not attacked the validity of the exclusionary rule in the state court.
See also Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (advocating overruling of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961)).
11
Ironically, in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, petitioners did not ask the Court to
ovemlle Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25. The sole argument to apply the
ex~lusionary rule to tl@tes is found in a single paragraph in an_..arnicus
brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union.
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dural obstacle existH, I s . e it a~ our r0spon~;ibility to end the
uncertainty and dc<:ide whether the t·ule will be modiH d.
The question of wh \ther probabl<.\ eauHe cxiHLPd for the iHHU-

ance of a warrant and wh<.\ther· the PvidencP st'tZ('d must be
excluded in thiH caHP should follow our rpeonsideration of the
framework by which such iHHUeH, aH they ariHP from the
F,ourth ArnendnlPnt, are to b . handled.
II
A

The exclusionary r·ule i~ a remedy adopted by this Court to
effectuate the I~.,ourth Amendment right of citizens ''to be ~e
cure in their persons, house~, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searche~ and seizures ... " Although early opinions suggested that the Constitution required exclusion of all
.illegally obtained evidence, the excluHionary rule ''has never
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally
seized evience in all proceedings or against all persons.''
Stone v. Po'well, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (197()). Because of the
inherent trustworthiness of seized tangible evidence and the
resulting social costs from its loss through suppression, application of the exclusionary rule has been carefully "restricted
to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously observed." UrLited States v. Cala'ndra, 414
U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Even at criminal trials the exclusionary rule has not been applied indiscriminately to ban all illegally obtained evidence without regard to the co:5ts and bene.~-~........
fits of doing so. lrljra, at
. These developments, bo
of years of experience with the exclusionary rule in op ration, forcefully suggcHt that the excluHionary rule be more
generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or sei-

zure was in accord with the l~ourth Amendm<.~nt.
This evolvement in the unclerHtanding of the })roper scoi>
of the excluHionary ·rule embraceH scvt~ral lineH of caHl s.
First, standing to invoke the cxcluHionary rttle has been lilnited to situation~ where the (}overnm 'nt H ' \ks to use such

81-430-CONCUR
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evidence against the victim of the unlawful search. Brown
v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128

(1978).

Second, the rule has not been applied in proceedings other
than the trial itself. In United States v. Calandra, 414
U. S. 338 (1974), the Court refused to extend the rule to
grand jury proceedings. "Any incremental deterrent effect
which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury
proceedings is uncertain at best. . . . We therefore decline
to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the role of
the grand jury." !d., at 348. Similarly, in United States v.
Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), the exclusionary rule was not extended to forbid the use in the federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally seized by state officials, since the likelihood of
deterring unlawful police conduct was not sufficient to outweigh the social costs imposed by the exclusion.
Third, even at a criminal trial, the same analysis has led us
to conclude that the costs of excluding probative evidence
outweighed the deterrence benefits in several circumstances.
We have refused to prohibit the use of illegally seized evidence for the purpose of impeaching a defendant who testifies
in his own behalf. United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620
(1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). We
have also declined to adopt a "per se or 'but for' rule" that
would make inadmissible any evidence which comes to light
through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 603 (1975). And we have
held that testimony of a live-witness may be admitted, notwithstanding that the testimony was derived from a concededly unconstitutional search. United States v. Ceccolini,
435 U. S. 268 (1978). Nor is exclusion required when law

enforcement agents act in good faith reliance upon a statute

or ordinance that is subsequently held to be unconstitutional.

-I
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United States v. Pelt·ier, 422 U. S. 531 (1977), Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31 (1979). 12 Cj: United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979) (exclusion not required of
evidence tainted by violation of an executive department's

rules concerning electronic eavesdropping).
A similar balancing approach is employed in our decisions
limiting the scope of the exclusionary remedy for Fifth
Amendment violations, Orego'n v. Haas, 420 U. S. 714 (1975);
Ha·rris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), and our cases considering

whether Fourth Amendment decisions should be applied retroactively, United States v. Peltier, supra at 528-539; Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 654-655 (1971) (plurality opinion); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. at 249-250;
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636-639. But see
United States v. Johnson,
U. S.
(1982).

These cases reflect that the exclusion of evidence is not a
personal constitutional right but a remedy, which, like all
remedies, must be sensitive to the costs and benefits of its
To be sure, Peltier and DeFillippo did not modify the exclusionary
rule itself. Peltier held that Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S.
266, was not to be given retroactive effect; DeFillippo upheld the validity
of an arrest made in good-faith reliance on an ordinance subsequently declared unconstitutional. The effect of these decisions, of course, was that
evidence was not excluded because of the officer's good-faith belief that he
was acting lawfully, and the Court's reasoning, as I discuss below, infra, at
- - , leads inexorably to the more general modification of the exclusionary
rule I favor. Indeed, JUSTICE BRENNAN recognized this in his dissent in
Peltier, 422 U. S., at 551-552.
I recognize that we have held that the exclusionary rule required suppression of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes,
not previously declared unconstitutional, which purported to authorize the
searches in question without probable cause and without a valid warrant.
See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v.
12

United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40
(1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). The results in these

cases may well be different under a "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.
.
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imposition. The trend a11d direction of our exclusionary· rule
decisions indicate not a le"'ser concern \Vith safeguarding the
Fourth Amendment btlt a fuller appreciation of the high costs
incun·ed ,,·hell probatiYe, reliable eYidence is barred because
of inv·e~ tigativ-e etTor. The primar~y cost, of course. is that
the exclusio11ar~.. rttle il1terferes \vith the truthseeking functioil of a criminal trial by· batTing relevant and trust,,·orthy·
eYidence.•-'- ''"e \viii neYer kno\v ho\v mrul).. guilt)· defendants
go free as a resttlt of the rule's operatio11. But an) rule of
/
evidence that denies the jury· access to clearly· probati,·e and v'
reliable e'ide11ce mttst bear a heav·~ btrrde11 of justification.
and must be carefull)r limited to the circumstances in \Yhich it
\Vill pay its ''a)' by· deterring official la,,·lessness. I do not
presume that modification of the exclusional1"' rule ''ill. b·v· itself, significant!)' reduce the crime rate but that is no excuse for indiscriminate application of the rule.
The suppression doctrine entails other costs as "·ell. It
\Vould be surprising if the suppression of e\idence garnered
in good-faith. but by means later found to \riolate the Fourth
Amendment, did not deter legitimate as ,,·ell as unla''~l police acti\rities. To the exte11t the rule operates to discourage

police from reasonable and proper in,·estigativ·e actions. it
hinders the solution and e,·en the pre,·ention of e1·ime. ..~
tremendous burden is also placed on the ~tate and federal judicial systems. One stud~ re,~eals that on -third of fedet~
defendants going to trial file Fourth J.~met1dmet1t ~u.ppre~~ n

The effects of the e.·clu~ionary rul are often f lt bef re
~ere h ~
trial. A recent study b ·the National In~titut f Ju8ti of~ l Yn~~
in California during the years 1976-197~ ''found l n1 ·or in1 t f th
clu5ionary rule on state pro~ecutiou~...
ati t\al In~titut f Ju~ti , Th
Effect of the .E.. ·clusionary Rul : • tud~ in l alif rni
h
tudy
found that 4. of th mot th n . 000 {! 1 t\Y' a~ d 'lin i ~ r
.
ecutton were reject d b aus of~ arch nd ~ izu
1 uns.
h
ionary rul \\ra found to hav a parti ularl~ pron un j tl
c
; pro cutors rej t d app1 .·im t ly · oa f 11 1 n~ · i
becau of arch nd s izu probl m .
13
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motions, and 70% to 90% of these involve formal hearings.
Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Proseuctions 10 (1979).
The rule also exacts a heavy price in undermining public
confidence in the reasonableness of the standards that govern
the criminal justice system. "[A]lthough the [exclusionary]
rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part
through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite
effect of generating disrespect for the law and the administration of justice." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 490-491.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE observed in his separate opinion in
Sto1ze v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 490: "The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer
and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of
the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice."
For these reasons, "application of the [exclusionary] rule
has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348. 14 The reasoning of our recent cases
Our decisions applying the exclusionary rule have referred to the "imperative of judicial integrity," Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222
(1960), although recent opinions of the Court make clear that the primary
function of the exclusionary rule is to deter violations of the Fourth
Amendment, Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 486; United States v. Janis,
428 U. S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v. Calandara, 414 U. S. 338, 348
(1974). I do not dismiss the idea that the integrity of the courts may be
compromised when illegally seized evidence is admitted, but I am convinced that the force of the argument depends entirely on the type of
search or seizure involved. At one extreme, there are lawless invasions of
personal privacy that shock the conscience and the admission of evidence so
obtained must be suppressed as a matter of Due Process, entirely aside
from the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S.
165 (1952). Also deserving of exclusionary treatment are searches and
seizures perpetrated in intentional and flagrant disregard of Fourth
Amendment principles. But the question of exclusion must be viewed
14
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strongly suggests that there is insufficient justification to
suppress evidence at a criminal trial which was seized in the
reasonable belief that the Fourth Amendment was not violated. The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule has
never been established by empirical evidence, despite repeated attempts. Un-ited States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at
449--453; Irvine v. Calijorrtia, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954). But
accepting that the rule deters some police misconduct, it is
apparent as a matter of logic that there is little if any deterrence when the rule is invoked to suppress evidence obtained
by a police officer acting in the reasonable belief that his conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. As we initially
observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S., at 447, and reiterated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S., at 539:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
through a different lens when a Fourth Amendment violation occurs because the police have reasonably erred in assessing the facts, mistakenly
conducted a search authorized under a presumably valid statute, or relied
in good-faith upon a warrant not supported by probable cause. In these
circumstances, the integrity of the courts. The violation of the Fourth
~is
Amendment is complete before the evidenc~ is admitted. Thus, "[t]he primary meaning of 'judicial integrity' in the context of evidentiary rules is
that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitution." United States v. Janis, supra, at 458, n. 35. Cf. United States v.
Peltier, 422 U. S., at 537 ("The teaching of these retroactivity cases is that
if the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial, the 'imperative of judicial
integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that material
even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have broadened the
exclusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that manner.") I am
content that the interests in judicial integrity run along with rather than
counter to the deterrence concept, and that to focus upon the latter is to
promote, not denigrate, the former.

not impl ·
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to i.nstill in those particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action
was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force."
The Court in Peltier continued, 422 U. S. at 542:
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."
See also United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 459, n. 35
("[T]he officers here were clearly acting in good faith . . . a
factor that the Court has recognized reduces significantly the
potential deterrent effect of exclusion.") The deterrent
value of the exclusionary sanction is most effective when officers engage in searches and seizures under circumstances "so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois,
422 U. S. 590, 610-611 (1975) (POWELL, J. concurring). On
the other hand, when officers perform their tasks in the goodfaith belief that their action comported with constitutional requirements, the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is
so minimal, if not non-existent, that the balance clearly favors the rule's modi:fication. 15
It has been suggested that the deterrence function of the exclusionary
rule has been understated by viewing the rule as aimed at special deterrence, when, in fact, the exclusionary rule is directed at "affecting the
wider audience of law enforcement officials and society at large." W.
LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure 6 (1983 Supp.). I agree that the exclusionary rule's purpose is not only, or even primarily, to deter the individual
police officer involved in the instant case. It appears that this objection
assumes that the proposed modification of the exclusionary rule will turn
15
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B
There are several types of Fourth Amendment violations
that may be said to fall under the rubric of "good faith."
"There will be those occasions where the trial or appellate
court will disagree on the issue of probable cause, no matter /
how reasonable the grounds for arrest appeared to the officer
and though reasonable men could easily differ on the question. It also happens that after the events at issue have occurred, the law may change, dramatically or ever so slightly,
but in any event sufficiently to require the trial judge to hold
that there was not probable cause to make the arrest and to
seize the evidence offered by the prosecution.... " Stone v.
only the subjective "good-faith" of the officer.

Grounding the modification
in objective reasonableness however, retains the value of the exclusionary
rule as an incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment. Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U. S. 200, 221 (STEVENS, J., concurring).
Indeed, the present indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule
may hinder the educative and deterrent function of the suppression remedy. "Instead of disciplining their employees, police departments generally have adopted the attitude that the courts cannot be satisfied, that the
rules are hopelessly complicated and subject to change, and that the suppression of evidence is the court's problem and not the departments'." J.
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1050
(1974). If evidence is suppressed only when a law enforcment officer
should have known that he was violating the Fourth Amendment, police
departments may look more seriously at the officer's misconduct when suppression is invoked. Moreover, by providing that evidence gathered in
good-faith reliance on a reasonable rule will not be excluded, a good-faith
rule creates an incentive for police departments to formulate rules governing activities of officers in the search and seizure area. Many commentators, including proponents of the exclusionary rule, recognize that the
formulation of such rules by police departments, and the training necessary
to implement these guidelines in practice, is perhaps the most effective
means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights. SeeK. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1971); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 Mich. L.
Rev. 659 (1972); A. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 416-431 (1974).
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Powell, 428 U. S., at 539-540. (WHITE, J., dissenting). The
argument for a good-faith exception is strongest, however,
~h~~ law enforcement officers have relied in good faith on a /
JUdicially-issued search warrant.
This Court has never articulated a rationale for applying
the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained pursuant
to a search warrant; it has simply done so without considering whether Fourth Amendment interests will be served. It
is my view that they will not be. When officers have dutifully obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate,
and execute the warrant as directed by its t erms, exclusion of
the evidence thus obtained cannot be expected to deter fut ure reliance on such warrants.
The warrant is prima-facie
pr oof that the officers acted reasonably in conducting the
search or seizure; "once the warrant issues, there is literally
nothing more than the policeman can do in seeking to comply
with the law. " Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 498 (BURGER,
C. J. , concurring). 16 As JUSTICE STEVENS put it in writing
for the Court in United States v. Ross,
U. S.
, --

(1982): "A warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices

to establish," that a law enforcement officer has "acted in
good faith in conducting the search." Nevertheless, the
warrant may be invalidated because of a technical defect or
because, as in this case, the magistrate issued a warrant on
information later determined to fall short of probable cause.
Excluding evidence for these reasons can have no possible
deterrent effect on future police conduct, unless it is to make
The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime concluded that
the situation in which an officer relies on a duly authorized warrant
"is a particularly compelling example of good faith. A warrant is a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest, and the
officer has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions. Accordingly, we believe that there should be a rule which states that evidence obtained pursuant to an within the scope of a warrant is prima facie the result of good
faith on the part of the officer seizing the evidence."
Final Report 55 (1981).
16
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Opponents of the proposed "reasonable belier' exception
suggest that such a modification would allow magistrates and
judges to flout the probable cause requirements in issuing
waiTants. This is a novel concept: the exclusionary rule was
adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish
the eiTors of magistrates and judges. Magistrates must be
neutral and detached from law enforcement operations and I
would not presume that a modification of the exclusionary
rule will lead magistrates to abdicate their responsibility to
apply the law. 17 In any event, I would apply the exclusionary rule when it is plainly evident that a magistrate or judge
Much is made of Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1971),
where we held that magistrates need not be legally trained. Shadwick's
holding was quite ~arrow. First, the Court insisted that "an issuing magistrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached, and he
must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search." 407 U. S., at 345. Second, in Shadwick, the
court clerk's authority extended only to the relatively straightforward task
of issuing arrest warrants for breach of municipal ordinances. To issue
search warrants, an individual must be capable of making the probable
cause judgments involved. In this regard, I reject the Court's insinuation
that it is too much to expect that persons who issue warrants remain
abreast of judicial refinements of probable cause. Ante, at 20. Finally, as
indicated in text, I do not propose that a warrant clearly lacking a basing in
probable cause can support a "good-faith" defense to invocation of the exclusionary rule.
17
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had no business issuing a warrant. See, e. g., Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 290
U. S. 41 ~1933). Similarly, the good-faith exception would /
~ot apply if the material presented to the magistrate or judge
IS false or misleading, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, or
so clearly lacking in probable cause that no well-trained offi.cer could reasonably have thought that a warrant should

ISSUe.

Another objection is that a reasonable belief exception will
encompass all searches and seizures on the frontier of the
Fourth Amendment, that such cases will escape review on
the question of whether the officer's action was permissible,
denying needed guidance from the courts and freezing
Fourth Amendment law in its present state. These fears
are unjustified. The premise of the argument is that a court
must first decide the reasonable belief issue before turning to
the question on whether a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred. I see no need for such an inflexible practice.
When a Fourth Amendment case presents a novel question of
law whose resolution is necessary to guide future action by
law enforcement officers and magistrates, there is sufficient
reason for the Court to decide the violation issue before turning to the good-faith question. Indeed, it may be difficult to
determine whether the officers acted reasonably until the
Fourth Amendment issue is resolved. 18 In other circumRespondents and some amici contend that this practice would be inconsistent with the Article III requirement of an actual case or controversy. I have no doubt that a defendant who claims that he has been subjected to an unlawful search or seizure and seeks suppression of the
evidentiary fruits thereof raises a live controversy within the Article III
authority of federal courts to adjudicate. It is fully appropriate for a court
to decide whether there has been a wrong before deciding what remedy to
impose. When questions of good-faith immunity have arisen under 42
U. S. C. § 1983, we have not been constrained to reach invariably the immunity question before the violation issue. Compare O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975) (finding constitutional violation and re18

/'
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stances, however, a suppression motion poses no Fourth
Amendment question of broad import-the issue is simply
whether the facts in a given case amounted to probable
cause in these cases, it would be prudent for a reviewing
court to immediately turn to the question of whether the officers acted in good faith.
Upon finding that they had, there
would generally be no need to consider the probable cause
question. I doubt that our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would suffer thereby. It is not entirely clear to me
that our law in this area has benefitted from the constant
pressure of fully-litigated suppression motions. The result
usually has been that initially bright-line rules have disappeared in a sea of ever-finer distinctions. Moreover, there is
much to be said for having our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evolve in part, albeit perhaps at a slower pace, in other
settings. 19
manding for consideration of good-faith defense) with Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 566, n. 14 (1978) (finding good-faith defense
first). Similarly, we have exercisd discretion in at times deciding the merits of a claim even though the error was harmless, while on other occasions
resolving the case solely by reliance on the harmless error doctrine. Compare Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372 (1972) (declining to decide
whether admission of confession was constitutional violation because error,
if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), with Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (upholding right to counsel at preliminary hearing
and remanding for harmless error determination).
19
For example, a pattern or practice of official conduct that is alleged to
violate Fourth Amendment rights may be challenged by an aggrieved individual in a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief. See, e. g. Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547 (1978). (Of course, there are limits on the
circumstances in which such actions will lie. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362
(1976); Los Angeles v. Lyons,
U. S.
(1983)). Although a municipality is not liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat Superior, local governing bodies are subject to suit for constitutional torts re-

sulting from implementation of local ordinances, regulations, policies, or
even customary practices. Monnell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U. S. 658 (1978). Such entities enjoy no immunity defense that might impede resolution of the substantive constitutional issue. Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U. S. 622 (1980). In addition, certain state courts
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Finally ' it is cont ended that a good-faith
. exception will be
diffi

.

~ult to appl~ in practice. This concern appears grounded

"? t e

1

assumption that courts would inquire into the subjec- /
tive belief of the law enforcement officers involved. I would

esche": such investigations. "Sending state and federal
courts Into the minds of police officers would produce a grave
and fruitless allocation of judicial resources." M assachusetts v. Pain'fen, 389 U. S. 560, 565 (1968) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Moreover, "[s]ubjective intent alone ... does not
make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional."
Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128 (1978). Just last Term,
we modified the qualified immunity public officials enjoy in
suits seeking damages for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, eliminating the subjective component of the standard. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
- - U. S.
(1982). Although searches pursuant to a
warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonable- 1
ness, I would measure the reasonableness of a particular ~·
search or seizure only by objective standards. Even for
warrantless searches, the requirement should be no more difficult to apply than the closely related good-faith test which
governs civil suits under § 1983. In addition, the burden will
likely be offset by the reduction in the number of cases which
will require ~elo~gated considerations of the probable cause
question, and will be greatly outweighed by the advantages
in limiting the bite of the exclusionary rule to the field in
which it is most likely to have its intended effects.

,

ttr~

Since a majority of the Court deems it inappropriate to admay continue to suppress, as a matter of state law, evidence in state trials
for any Fourth Amendment violation. These cases would likely provide a
sufficient supply of state criminal cases in which to resolve unsettled questions of Fourth Amendment law. As a final alternative, I would entertain
the possibility of according the benefits of a new Fourth Amendment rule
to the party in whose case the rule is first announced. See Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 301 (1967).

J
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the Court d
at Issue, I bnefly address the question that
search
oe~ reach-whether the warrant authorizing the
t.
. and seiZure of respondents' car and home was cons Itu~wnally valid. Abandoning the "two-pronged test" of
AgY:zlar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v.
Un.zt~d States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), the Court upholds the

validity of the warrant under a new "totality of the circumstances" approach. Although I agree that the warrant
should be upheld, I reach this conclusion in accordance with
the Aguilar-Spinelli framework.
A
F or pr esent purposes, the A guilar-Spinelli rules can be
summed up as follows. First, an affidavit based on an informer's tip, standing alone, cannot provide probable cause
for issuance of a warrant unles~ the tip includes information
that ap~Ases the magistrate of t he informant's basis for concluding t at the contraband is where he claims it is (the
"basis of knowledge" prong), an d the affiant informs t h e
magistrate of his basis for believing that the informant is
credible (the "veracity'' prong). Aguilar, su pra, at 114;
Spinelli, supra, at 412-413, 416. 20 Second, if a tip fails under
either or both of the two prongs, probable cause may yet be
established by independent police investigatory work that

/

The "veracity'' prong is satisfied by a recitation in the affidavit that the
informant previously supplied accurate information to the police, see
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300, 303--304 (1967), or by proof that the informant gave his information against his penal interest, see United States
v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 583-584 (1971) (plurality opinion). The "basis of
knowledge" prong is satisfied by a statement from the informant that he
personally observed the criminal activity, or, if he came by the information
indirectly, by a satisfactory explanation of why his sources were reliable,
or, in the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, by a description of the accused's criminal activity
in sufficient detail that the magistrate may infer that the informant is r elying on something more substantial than casual rumor or an individual's
general reputation. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 416 (1969).
20
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corroborates the ti t
the inference that ~h o ~uch an extent that it supports "both

mt

and that h
d . e Informer was generally trustworthy
tained · e
e hzs charge on the basis of information obstance In a re zable way·" Spinelli, .supra, at 417. In inu . 8 ~here the officers rely on corroboration, the ultimate
q est~on IS _whether the corroborated tip "is as trustworthy
as a tip WhiCh would pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration." I d., at 415.
. In t~e present case, it is undisputed that the anonymous
tip, by Itself, did !!£t furnish probable cause. The question is

whether those portions of the affidavit describing the results
of the police investigation of the respondents, when considered in light of the tip, "would permit the suspicions engendered by the informant's report to ripen into a judgment that
a crime was probably being committed." Spinelli, supra, at
418. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the corroboration was insufficient to permit such a ripening. App. 9a.
The court reasoned as follows:
"[T]he nature of the corroborating evidence in this case
would satisfy neither the "basis of knowledge" nor the
"veracity" prong of Aguilar. Looking to the affidavit

submitted as support for Detective Mader's request that
a search warrant issue, we note that the corroborative
evidence here was only of innocent activity. Mader's independent investigation rev-ealed only that Lance and
Sue Gates lived on Greenway Drive; that Lance Gates
booked passage on a flight to Florida; that upon arriving
he entered a room registered to his wife; and that he and
his wife left the hotel together by car. The corroboration of innocent activity is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause." App. 12a.

In my view, the lower court's characterization of the Gates'
activity here as totally "innocent" is dubious. In fact, the
behavior was quite suspicious. I agree with the Court, ante,
at 26, that Lance Gates' flight to Palm Beach, an area known

j
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to be a so
t I
urce of narcotics th b .
e' and apparent imm d'
e rieLovernight stay in a mot~at ~rained law-enfor~e Ia e retu N rth, suggest a pattern
dicative of illicit dru -d mli~nt offi~~rs have recognized as inEv
h
g ea ng activity. zt
en, owever had th
b
.
pletely innocuous'
. . ~ corr~ oratwn related only to comelude th .
activities, this fact alone would not pre.. .
.
e Issuance of a valid
t Th
not whether th
. ..
warran ·
e critical 1ssue 1s
. .
e activities observed by the police are innocent
orh suspicious. Instead, the proper focus should be on
~ eth~r the act~ons of the suspects, whatever their nature,
give rise to an Inference that the informant is credible and I
that he obtained his information in a reliable manner.
. Thus, in Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), an
Informant stated on Sept. 7 that Draper would be carrying
narcotics when he arrived by train in Denver on the morning
of Sept. 8 or Sept. 9. The informant also provided the police
with a detailed physical description of the clothes Draper
would be wearing when he alighted from the train. The police observed Draper leaving a train on the morning of Sept.
9, and he was wearing the precise clothing described by the
informant. The Court held that the police had probable
cause to arrest Draper at this point, even though the police
had seen nothing more than the totally innocent act of a man
getting off a train carrying a briefcase. As we later explained in Spinelli, the important point was that the corroboration showed both that the informant was credible, i. e. that
he "had not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth,"
Spinelli, supra, at 417, and that he had an adequate basis of
knowledge for his allegations, "since the report was of the
sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable way." ld., at 417-418. The
fact that the informer was able to predict, two days in advance, the exact clothing Draper would be wearing dispelled

t

See ante, at 26; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 562 (1980)
(POWELL, J., concurring).
21
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the poss1·b·1·
1 tty that his tip was just based on rumor or "an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." I d., at 417.
~robably Draper had planned in advance to wear these specrfic c_lothes so that an accomplice could identify him. A
clear Inference could therefore be drawn that the informant
was either involved in the criminal scheme himself or that he
otherwise had access to reliable, inside information. 22
As in Drape'r, the police investigation in the present case
satisfactorily demonstrated that the informant's tip was as
trustworthy as one that would alone satisfy the Aguilar
tests. The tip predicted that Sue Gates would drive to Florida, that Lance Gates would fly there a few days after May 3,
and that Lance would then drive the car back. After the police corroborated these facts, 23 the magistrate could reasonably have inferred, as he apparently did, that the informant,
who had specific knowledge of these unusual travel plans, did
not make up his story and that he obtained his information in
a reliable way. It is theoretically possible, as respondents
insist, that the tip could have been supplied by a "vindictive
travel agent" and that the Gates' activities, although unusual,
might not have been unlawful. 24 But Aguilar and Spinelli,
Thus, as interpreted in Spinelli, the Court in Draper held that there
was probable cause because "the kind of infonnation related by the informant [was] not generally sent ahead of a person's arrival in a city except to
those who are intimately connected with making careful arrangements for
meeting him." Spinelli, supra, at 426 (WHITE, J., concurring). As I said
in Spinelli, the conclusion that Draper itself was based on this fact is far
from inescapable. Prior to Spinelli, Draper was susceptible to the interpretation that it stood for the proposition that "the existence of the tenth
and critical fact is made sufficiently probable to justify the issuance of a
warrant by verifying nine other facts coming from the same source."
Spinelli, supra, at 42~27 (WHITE, J., concurring). But it now seems
clear that the Court in Spinelli rejected this reading of Draper.
22

23

JusTICE STEVENS

is correct, post, at 1, that one of the infonnant's /

predictions proved to be inaccurate. However, I agree with the Court,
ante, at 28, n. 14, that an informant need not be infallible.
24
It is also true, as JUSTICE STEVENS points out, post, at 2, n. 3, that the

26
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tabli h d b f,
ses, o not require that certain guilt be esth s e .e. ore a warrant may properly be issued. "[O]nly
t" ~ pr?bab1hty, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal acIVIty !s. the standard of probable cause." Spinelli, supra, at
j,19 (citmg Beck v. Ohio, _379 U. S. 89, 96 (1964)). I there-

ore conclude that the JUdgment of the Illinois Supreme
Court invalidating the warrant must be reversed.
B

The Court agrees that the warrant was valid, but, in the
process of reaching this conclusion, it overrules the AguilarSpinelli tests and replaces them with a "totality of the circumstances" standard. As shown above, it is not at all nee- \
essary to overrule Aguilar-Spinelli in order to reverse the )
judgment below. Therefore, because I am inclined to believe that, when applied properly, the Aguilar-Spinelli rules
play an appropriate role in probable cause determinations,
and because the Court's holding may foretell an evisceration
of the probable cause standard, I do not join the Court's
holding.
The Court reasons, ante, at 18, that the "veracity" and
"basis of knowledge" tests are not independent, and that a
deficiency as to one can be compensated for by a strong showing as to the other. Thus, a finding of probable cause may be
based on a tip from an informant "known for the unusual reliability of his predictions" or from "an unquestionably honest
citizen," even if the report fails thoroughly to set forth the
basis upon which the information was obtained. Ibid. If
fact that respondents were last seen leaving West Palm Beach on a northbound interstate highwa~is far from conclusive proof that they were heading directly to Bloomington. It indeed was entirely possible that they
were innocently heading to Disney World, Cape Canaveral, or even Washington, D.C. But it is rather improbable that an ordinary vacationer
would fly into a city one evening and then, at 7:00 the next morning, leave
in a car with a false license plate for a day of sightseeing in a different
location.
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this is so, then it must follow a fortiori that "the affidavit of
an officer, known by the magistrate to be honest and experi-

~nc,~d, stating that [contraband] is located in a certain build- .
Ing must be acceptable. Spinelli, 393 U. S., at 424
(WHITE, J., concurring). It would be "quixotic" if a similar
statement from an honest informant, but not one from an
honest officer, could furnish probable cause. Ibid. But
we have repeatedly held that the unsupported assertion or
belief of an officer does not satisfy the probable cause requirement. See, e. g., Whitely v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560,
564-565; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 269 (1960);
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). 25 Thus,
this portion of today's holding can be read as implicitly rejecting the teachings of these prior holdings.
The Court may not intend so drastic a result. Indeed, the
Court expressly reaffirms, ante, at 24, the validity of cases
such as Nathanson that have held that, no matter how reliable the affiant-officer may be, a warrant should not be issued unless the affidavit discloses supporting facts and circumstances. The Court limits these cases to situations
involving affidavits containing only "bare conclusions" and
holds that, if an affidavit contains anything more, it should be
left to the issuing magistrate to decide, based solely on "practical[ity]" and "common-sense," whether there is a fair probability that contraband will be found in a particular place.

Ibid.

Thus, as I read the majority opinion, it appears that the
question whether the probable cause standard is to be diluted
is left to the common-sense judgments of issuing magistrates.
I am reluctant to approve any standard that does not expressly require, as a prerequisite to issuance of a warrant,
some showing of facts from which an inference may be drawn
I have already indicated my view, supra, at
, that such a ''barebones" affidavit could not be the basis for a good-faith issuance of a
walTant.
25
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that the informant is credible and that his information was
o~tained in a reliable way. The Court is correctly concerned
/
With the fact that some lower courts have been applying ¥
Aguilar-Spinelli in an unduly rigid manner. 26 I believe,
however, that with clarification of the rule of corroborating
information, the lower courts are fully able to properly interpret Aguilar-Spinelli and avoid such unduly-rigid applications. I may be wrong; it ultimately may prove to be the
case that the only profitable instruction we can provide to
magistrates is to rely on common sense. But the question
whether a particular anonymous tip provides the basis for issuance of a warrant will often be a difficult one, and I would
at least attempt to provide more precise guidance by clarifying Aguilar-Spinelli and the relationship of those cases with
Draper, before totally abdicating our responsibility in this
area. Hence, I do not join the Court's opinion rejecting the

Aguilar-Spinelli rules.

Bridger v. State, 503 S. W. 2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), and Peo,ple
v. Palanza, 371 N. E. 2d 687 (Ill. App. 1978), which the Court describes
ante, at 19, n. 9, appear to me to be excellent examples of overly-technical
applications of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard. The holdings in these cases
could easily be disapproved without reliance on a "totality of the circumstances" analysis.
26

